This is where things got surreal for me. After mapping the full protocol, Claude Code—on its own—decided the next step was to actually talk to the C2.
This was interesting but I feel like it's pretty risky to do this. Dead code analysis is one thing, but once you start talking to live malware servers, the risk increases significantly. I wouldn't allow Claude to do this without explicit approval of each step, and I especially wouldn't do it from my home IP, apparently with no network segmenting.
The article was interesting, but parts were either AI generated or had a repetitive tone similar to AI writing:
It's made by a company called Hotack (sold under brand names like Magcubic). A thin disguise.
It didn't sneak onto the device; it was baked in from the start.
If HTTPS fails entirely, it falls back to plain HTTP. Security wasn't exactly the priority.
Anyone who paid Kookeey for proxy access could route their traffic through my IP, making it look like their requests came from a Stanford dorm room. And I was supposed to be the customer.
An organized operation with access to the full Allwinner SDK, enterprise build infrastructure, and the manufacturer's signing keys. This is manufacturer malware.
mtlynch | 15 hours ago
This was interesting but I feel like it's pretty risky to do this. Dead code analysis is one thing, but once you start talking to live malware servers, the risk increases significantly. I wouldn't allow Claude to do this without explicit approval of each step, and I especially wouldn't do it from my home IP, apparently with no network segmenting.
The article was interesting, but parts were either AI generated or had a repetitive tone similar to AI writing: