I was curious and checked the certificates from Mozilla's CCADB, but only found the eMudhra keys again, so we can assume that the other keys are at least slightly better.
I'm surprised that it wouldn't be standard practice to at least try to break the public key by looking for small private keys.
Especially if you know you're messing around with weak keys on the same HSM.
I can't imagine the sequence of events which led to this buffoonery.
eMudhra have given their account of what happened on that ticket. It seems there was a bug in the script used during the ceremony, a second, weak key pair was created on the HSM, and having similar names a human error lead to the wrong keys being used for the CSR.
icefox | 6 hours ago
Wonder what we'd find if we spent a few minutes each on trying to brute force everyone's public keys. Any volunteers?
oliverpool | 5 hours ago
I believe that most of the CA keys have now been tested...
loopylobster | 3 hours ago
I was curious and checked the certificates from Mozilla's CCADB, but only found the eMudhra keys again, so we can assume that the other keys are at least slightly better.
edwintorok | 30 minutes ago
I'm surprised that it wouldn't be standard practice to at least try to break the public key by looking for small private keys. Especially if you know you're messing around with weak keys on the same HSM.
pyj | 14 minutes ago
Is there a compelling reason to purposely generate weak keys on the hsm?
mperham | 2 hours ago
I can't imagine the sequence of events which led to this buffoonery.