Edit: Before reading this post, I'd like to state that the title is incorrect, and I'd edit it if I could. The subject of the posts here are scientifically-inclined people I've encountered, who're either themselves scientists or brought up in a culture that idealizes science. The objective of the post was to garner a sense of the accuracy of these assumptions, not necessarily to make a claim that a certain subset exists that holds these positions.
Hey there. I used to be very pro-science, but over time, noticed that there were certain assumptions in science that seemed very problematic to me. This resulted in me changing my stance on science and its scope of application, leading to me being anti-science in many respects.
I'm now considering whether the issue is in science or in assumptions of people who conduct science, and I'm converging on the latter. I'm also interested in having a more precise idea of the constitution of science, since it was because of equating science roughly with scientists that I found a problem with science itself. That said, its internal constitution is not itself the subject of this post.
I've mapped out certain problematic assumptions that I've encountered in many scientists. I'd appreciate an evaluation of whether this is accurate and whether it can be extended. They are as follows:
Even though positivism is no longer popular in philosophy, it seems that it's become ingrained for many people. I say this because there have been many times online and in-person when a person A claims P and a scientifically-inclined person B asks, "where is the empirical evidence to support P?", as though it's only meaningful if empirical evidence exists. If A is unable to supply empirical evidence, B either rejects P or treats it as nonsense.
Now, of course, if P warrants empirical evidence, it should require empirical evidence for justification. But people seem to assume all propositions warrant roughly the same kind of evidence. This is where I disagree and am more inclined to a Husserlian theory of evidence where different provinces of being warrant different kinds of evidence, and the evidence-grade of each kind of evidence is in turn determined by the essence of the manner in which the province of beings stands in relation to appearances. Though this is not something I've developed in its entirety.
It also seems not many scientists who tacitly hold positivism are aware of its consequences with respect to their axiology. Intrinsic value (seen in claims of the kind "X is intrinsically good/bad") cannot be discerned by any of the senses. This would necessitate either the rejection of intrinsic value or a view which regards it as only an emotional expression that states nothing meaningful. Many scientists however seem to have very strong ethical stances on a lot of issues, so it seems very internally contradictory.
I believe positivism also commits its holders to absurd positions such as that "humans don't exist." But I won't get into this in depth.
Physicalism is another very popular assumption it seems, and not just the one where the totality of the mind/consciousness is reduced to physical matter, but where only physical matter is what exists in the world.
First, I believe this claim is too strong and can be easily defeated. This is because we don't have access to the totality of what exists unless we deliberately restrict what exists to what can be experienced with the senses, at which point the claim is simply tautological. Second, non-tautological physicalism is incompatible with the tacit positivism that is held. The physicalist thesis is neither mathematical nor empirical, thus it should be dismissed in its entirety and treated as nonsense. So as a whole, it seems the assumptions that many scientists take for granted themselves aren't internally coherent.
Lastly, we have cognitive completeness. This is roughly where scientists assume that everything must be discernable, explainable, and understandable to humans. If we aren't able to cognize its truth or falsity it must be nonsensical.
This, like physicalism, itself should be rejected if one holds positivism since it's neither empirical nor mathematical. But even if we aren't committed to internal coherence, the claim is too strongly quantified and we can easily attack that.
How would the individuals here evaluate these assumptions? Do you believe they somewhat reflect the tacit assumptions held by scientists? Can you justify them? Are there more assumptions that are good to be aware of?